Equal rules or equal opportunities? Demystifying level playing field

Pleas for a level playing field, for instance in international trade, are often not well-founded. This is because it is not exactly clear what a 'level playing field' means. But even if it would be clear what the plea would imply, a level playing field is not always desirable from an economic perspective. To clarify the meaning of 'a level playing field' we introduce two specifications of the concept. First, a rules-based level playing field, which means that all firms in a market are treated the same in equal circumstances with regard to legislation, taxes, subsidies etcetera. Second, an outcome-based level playing field, which means that all firms in a market have the same expected profit. This means that, in case firms are heterogeneous, the government compensates the disadvantaged firms (for instance with subsidies). The first conclusion in the report is that a rules-based level playing field is desirable, although there are reasons to deviate from this assumption. The second conclusion is that it is never desirable to pursue a fully outcome-based level playing field, but that it may be desirable to level the playing field to a certain extent in the case of market failure. In case of market failure it is preferable to use symmetric rules (equal for all firms), in stead of asymmetric rules (favouring some firms). The report introduces a framework with questions that can help policymakers analyse level playing field issues. The framework makes clear that in general one cannot tell�whether a plea for a 'level playing field' is justified or not. It is necessary to focus on the policy issues hidden behind the plea, i.e. policy issues concerning market failure, dynamic efficiency, redistribution of income and differences in preferences between countries.

The Transition from a Drèze Equilibrium to a Walrasian Equilibrium

In this paper a continuous time price and quantity adjustment process is considered for an economy facing price rigidities. In the short run prices are assumed to be completely fixed and the markets are cleared by quantity adjustments until a fixed price equilibrium is reached where every market is typically characterized by either supply rationing or demand rationing. Next prices are assumed to move upwards in case of demand rationing on a market and downwards when supply rationing occurs. Markets are kept in equilibrium by infinitesimal quantity adjustments such that at every moment in time a fixed price equilibrium results. Using only standard assumptions on the primitive concepts of the economy it is shown that the price and quantity adjustment process indeed converges to a fixed price equilibrium for the initially given prices. Moreover, in the long run, when prices are allowed to change, the process is shown to reach a Walrasian equilibrium. A simplicial algorithm is developed to approximate the price and quantity adjustment process arbitrarily close. It is shown that the path of price systems and rationing schemes generated by the algorithm converges to the path of the adjustment process.Adjustment processes; price rigidities; simplicial algorithms

Higher education reform: getting the incentives right

This study is a joint effort by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) and the Center for Higher Education Policy Studies. It analyses a number of `best practices¿ where the design of financial incentives working on the system level of higher education is concerned. In Chapter 1, an overview of some of the characteristics of the Dutch higher education sector is presented. Chapter 2 is a refresher on the economics of higher education. Chapter 3 is about the Australian Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS). Chapter 4 is about tuition fees and admission policies in US universities. Chapter 5 looks at the funding of Danish universities through the so-called taximeter-model, that links funding to student performance. Chapter 6 deals with research funding in the UK university system, where research assessments exercises underlie the funding decisions. In Chapter 7 we study the impact of university-industry ties on academic research by examining the US policies on increasing knowledge transfer between universities and the private sector. Finally, Chapter 8 presents food for thought for Dutch policymakers: what lessons can be learned from our international comparison